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5 Technical change and US economic 
growth: the interwar period 
and the 1990s 
Alexander J. Field 
5.1 Introduction 
Looking back over the twentieth century, the year 1948-1973 stand out as the 
"golden age" of labor productivity growth and living tandard improvement 
in the United State - the result of a combination of re pectable multifactor 
productivity (MEP) growth and robust rates of capital deepening. The period 
1973- 1989, in contra t, wa the mo t di appointing, because of the virtual 
collap e of multifactor productivity growth during the e year . The contrast 
between these period gave rise to a raft of studies trying to pinpoint the cau e of 
the slowdown in MFP growth and, a a con equence, labor productivity growth. 
More recently, attention ha hifted towards determining the contribution of the 
IT revolution to the revival of productivity growth in the 1990 . 
Mo t of these studies, however, embrace an hi torical perspective that reaches 
back no further than 1948, the year in which most of the standard series main-
tained by the Bureau of Labor Statistic (BLS) begin. This chapter, in contra t, 
pushe the time horizon back to the beginning of the twentieth century, with 
particular attention to the period following the Fir t World War and preced-
ing US entry into the Second World War in 1941. It combine a summary of 
the magnitude and sources of productivity advance during the interwar years 
(for more details, ee Field, 2003, 2006a) with a comparative examination of 
progre during the la t decade of the century. 
Becau e of the influence of cyclical factors on productivity levels, it i com-
mon in historical re earch to re trict calculation of productivity growth rates 
to peak-to-peak comparison . For the mo t recent episode, this requires mea-
surement from 1989 to 2000. Many tudents of the productivity revival prefer, 
nevertheless, to measure from 1995. Although 1995 i not a business cycle 
peak, the acceleration in output growth after 1995 does make the revival look 
more striking. Whether it i de irable or appropriate to choo e one 's start date 
with the objective of making the contra t between recent and pa t history more 
dramatic is, of cour e, an open que tion. 
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Table 5.1 Compound annual growth rates of MFP, labor, and capital 
productivity in the US private non-farm economy, 1901-2000 
Output/unit 
MFP Output/hour Output/adju ted hour capital input 
1901 - 1919 1.08 1.71 1.44 0.01 
19 19- 1929 2.02 2.27 2.33 1.09 
1929- 194 1 2.31 2.35 2.21 2.47 
194 1- 1948 1.29 1.71 1.42 1.32 
1948- 1973 1.90 2.88 2.64 0.18 
1973- 1989 0.34 1.34 1.03 - 1.24 
1989-2000 0.78 1.92 1.41 - 0.61 
1973- 1995 0.38 1.37 0.98 - 0.98 
1995- 2000 1.14 2.46 2.08 - 0.84 
NB: "Output per adju ted hour" u es an hour index that ha been augmented to refl ect 
changes in labor quality or compo ition. In creating thi index, different categories of 
labor are weighted by the ir respective wage rate . 
Sources: 1901- 1948 - Kendrick (1961 , tab le A-XXIII; the unadjusted data are fro m 
the column headed "Output per man hour," the adju ted data from the column headed 
"Output per unit of labor-input," and capital productivity i "Output per unit of capital 
input"); I 948- 2000 - Bureau of Labor Stati tic , www.bl .gov, series MPU75002 1, 
MPU750023, MPU750024, and MPU750028; the e data are from the multifac tor pro-
ductivity secti on of the web ite, accessed 12 April 2004; the labor productivity ection 
contain more recent data and is updated more frequently. 
That said, the recent achievement i impre ive when mea ured in relation 
to the period of low growth that preceded it. But, even if we how the recent 
acceleration in its be t light, by measuring from 1995 to the peak of the cycle 
in 2000, the end-of-century labor productivity advance remained well below 
"golden age" rates. Perhap more urpri ingly, it remained in the same range 
as that regi tered during the interwar period ( ee table 5.1). And multifac-
tor productivity growth was less than half what it wa during the Depression 
years.1 
The seminal studie by Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) showed that, 
in compari on with the nineteenth century, a large gap opened up in the first 
half of the twentieth century between the growth of real output and a weighted 
average of inputs conventionally measured. Thi gap, termed the "residual," wa 
sub equently interpreted by Abramovitz a reflecting a shift to a knowledge-
based type of economic development, which, from the vantage point of the 
middle of the century, wa expected to persist (Abramovitz, 1993, p. 224). 
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By and large it did o for another quarter-century. But the ixteen-year period 
of low productivity growth generally dated from 1973 forced, or hould have 
forced, a rea essment of the view that the Abramovitz and Solow tudie had 
identified a permanent ea change. The end-of-century revival of productivity 
growth, in tum, ha focu ed attention on what caused the growth of the residual 
to accelerate and how much of it could be laid at the feet of IT. 
This chapter focu es on the two major cycle of the interwar period ( 1919-
1929 and 1929-1941 ) and the more recent 1989-2000 period. All three period 
experienced comparable labor productivity growth rates. The respective contri-
bution of multifactor productivity growth and capital deepening were, however, 
quite different, as were the sectoral locations of rapid advance. 
5.2 Overview of twentieth-century growth trends 
For the moment, let 's look forward from 1929. With some implification the 
labor productivity growth history of the United State between 1929 and 1995 
can be thought of as con isting of three periods in which the re pective con-
tributions of MFP growth and capital deepening were quite di tinct. The years 
1929-1948 witnes ed exceptionally high rates of MFP growth, but little capital 
deepening. 
Between 1948 and 1973 lower but till re pectable MFP growth combined 
with a revival of phy ical capital deepening to produce the highest rates of labor 
productivity growth in the century, and a golden age of living standard improve-
ment. Between 1973 and 1995 capital deepening continued at omewhat slower 
rates but multifactor productivity growth in the US economy effectively disap-
peared. Labor productivity ro e, but at greatly reduced rate (1.37 percent per 
year) compared with the 2.88 percent annual growth clocked during the golden 
age (see table 5.1 ; data are for the private non-farm economy (PNE)) . At the 
end of the century labor productivity growth again approached golden age rates, 
principally a the result of a revival of MFP growth . 
5.3 The rise in output per hour during the Depression: 
causes and consequences 
A number of economist have been aware of the ri e in output per hour dur-
ing the Depres ion , but most of the attention in explaining thi ha been on 
the effects of the selective retention of worker , particularly during the 1929-
1933 downturn (Margo, 1991). By 1941 , however, when recovery had finally 
pu hed unemployment rates into single-digit level , much of this hould have 
been unwound. There were secular improvements in labor quality during the 
Depre ion years as well , but a compari on of column 2 and 3 of table 5.1 sug-
gests that such improvements can explain only a small fraction of the growth 
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in output per hour between 1929 and 1941.2 Clearly, other factors had to have 
been operative - and these could not have included phy ical capital deepening, 
as can also be een from table 5.1. 
Since there was virtually no increa e in private sector inputs conventionally 
measured between 1929 and 1941, MFP advance accounted for all of the 32 
percent increase in the real output of the private non-farm economy over these 
years. And, since there wa no private ector capital deepening, the same was 
true for the increa e in output per hour. Masked by the continuing level of 
high unemployment, an impre sive expansion of the potential output of the US 
economy was taking place. 
Does the claim that the Depression years witne sed the highest MFP growth 
rate of the century include consideration of the end-of-century "new economy" 
boom? The short answer is that it does. My office at a univer ity in the heart of 
Silicon Valley offered a ring ide view of the investment boom, the rising share 
prices, and some of the hyperbolic claim that drove both. For better or for worse, 
thi enthusia m led to a reorganization of the federal government's statistical 
apparatus in an effort to make it more sensitive to the possible contributions of 
the IT revolution to growth. 
But the data from the end of the twentieth century, even after incorporating the 
use of hedonic methods to adju t for quality change , tell a more nuanced tory. 
Revolutionary technological or organizational change - the ort that hows 
up in MFP growth - was concentrated in distribution, ecurities trading, and 
a narrow range of industries within a hrinking manufacturing sector. MFP 
advance within industry wa largely localized within the old SIC 35 and 36,3 
sector that include the production of semiconductors, computers, networking, 
and telecommunication equipment. Aggregate MFP growth remained modest 
by the historical standards of the twentieth century. 
Evidence from the beginning of the twenty-first century suggests the possi-
bility of more ub tantial MFP payback in the IT-u ing sectors, albeit delayed 
(Wall Street Journal, 2003) . Labor productivity grew at 3.04 percent per year 
continuously compounded from 1995 through 2004 (BLS series PRS85006093, 
acce sed 19 June 2005) . This represents very strong performance, particularly 
after 2000. At the time this chapter was written, however, we did not have MFP 
estimates beyond 2002, so it remains unclear how much of early twenty-fir t-
century growth must be due to an increa e in the labor composition contri-
bution due to selective retention (which would not persi tat thi rate through 
a full recovery), or how much the capital deepening contribution may have 
changed since the heady days of 1995-2000. Capital ervice grew at 5.38 per-
cent per year between 1995 and 2000, and their rate of increa e has certainly 
slowed. But hour , which grew at over 2 percent per year between 1995 and 
2000, declined at 1.85 percent per year between 2000:2 and 2003:2. Even with 
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sub equent recovery, hours in 2005: 1 were still 3 percent below their peak in 
2000. Until we have the most recent capital ervice number we can't know 
what has happened to the capital/hour ratio. Between 2000 and 2002 (the 
latest year for which we have capital services data) capital services per hour 
ro every rapidly - a total of 12.4 percent - a the numerator continued tori e 
and the denominator declined. We will need to have the economy approach 
cJoser to potential output, and have the data for it, before we can have a clearer 
picture of the u tainability of these recent trends. The bottom line is that, 
mea uring from 1989 through the end of the boom in 2000, aggregate MFP 
growth, including that in the IT-using sectors, although more than double the 
rate in 1973-1989, was only a third that regi tered between 1929 and 1941 (see 
table 5.1 ). 
Why 1989? And why 2000? Multifactor productivity data i available only 
on an annual basis. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) busines cycle chronology, the peak of activity in July 1990 wa fol-
lowed by a rece ion that bottomed out in March 1991 , followed by the long 
expansion of the 1990 , culminating in the peak 120 months later (March 2001). 
But 2001 was also a year of economic downturn, with the trough reached only 
eight months afterward , in November that year. Similarly, 1990 included five 
post-peak month . Since we are u ing annual data, I mea ure from the la t full 
year of expan ion (1989) before a downturn to the ubsequent final full year of 
expansion before a downturn (2000).4 
It i well known that MFP and labor productivity grew at an accelerated 
pace during the econd half of the 1990s, and it has become conventional to 
mea ure to and from 1995, even though the year was not a business cycle 
peak. The argument again t 1995 is that it is not a peak, a point reflected in 
the controver y urrounding Gordon's claims that much of the end-of-century 
improvement reflected a cyclical acceleration in both labor and multifactor 
productivity common in later tage of a busine expansion (Gordon , 2003c). 
Nevertheless, there doe eem to be a break in the eries circa 1995, and, in 
deference to current practice, table 5.1 also reports MFP advance over the last 
five years of the century. Here the compound average annual growth rate comes 
in at 1.14 percent per year. This i three times the anemic MFP growth regi tered 
between 1973 and 1995. But it i still sub tantially below golden age rates and, 
even more remarkably, less than half the rate registered between 1929 and 
1941. 
5.4 The role of manufacturing 
If we are discussing contributions to achieved productivity levels in the inter-
war period, it i appropriate to place a good deal of empha i on a growing 
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Table 5.2 The growth of MFP, labor, and capital productivity in 
manufacturing in the United States, 1919-2000 
MFP Output/hour Output/adjusted hour 
1919- 1929 5.12 5.45 5.45 
1929-1941 2.60 2.61 2.46 
1941-1948 - 0.52 0.20 0.03 
1949- 1973 1.49 2.51 n.a. 
1973- 1989 0.57 2.42 n.a. 
1989- 2000 1.58 3.56 n.a. 
1973- 1995 0.66 2.61 n.a. 











Sources: 1919- 29 - Kendrick (1961 , table D-1, p. 464); 1929- 1941 and 1941- 1948 -
output and labor input are from Kendrick (1961, tables D-1 and D-2), capital input is 
based on the index for manufacturing fixed capital in the BEA's Fixed As et Table 
(4.2, www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dN/FAweb/lndex2002.htm), MFP is calculated based on 
an assumed share of 0.7 for labor, 0.3 for capital; 1949-2000 - Bureau of Labor 
Statistics , series MPU300001 , MPU300002, MPU300003, acces ed 22 November 
2004. 
manufacturing sector that by 1941 comprised almost a third of the economy. 
I estimate that 84 percent of MFP growth in the private non-farm economy 
between 1919 and 1929 and about 48 percent of the growth between 1929 and 
1941 originated in manufacturing (see below). For 1995-2000 manufacturing 's 
contribution was about 39 percent of private non-farm MFP growth, but that 
total and manufacturing 's percentage point contribution to it were much maller 
than was true in the interwar period. 
Although Kendrick does not provide enough information to allow the calcu-
lation of MFP growth rates within manufacturing for the 1929-1941 and 1941-
1948 sub-periods, one can do so for the sector as a whole using Kendrick 's 
e timates for output and labor input combined with capital input data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis's (BEA's) Fixed Asset Tables (see table 5.2).5 
These calculations show MFP growth within the ector over the 1929-41 period 
to have proceeded at the rate of 2.60 percent per year. This is higher than 
in any subsequent period of the twentieth century. It does, however, repre-
sent a halving of the 5.12 percent rate registered over the 1919-1929 period, 
years in which the flexibility offered by the unit drive electric motor facilitated 
the shift to a single-story layout and the as embly line production of automo-
biles and a host of new electrically powered consumer durables (Devine, 1983; 
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Table 5.3 The employment of scientists and engineers in US manufacturing, 
1927-1940 
1927 1933 1940 
Chemicals 1812 3255 7675 
Electrical machinery 732 1322 3269 
Petroleum 465 994 2849 
Non-electrical machinery 421 629 2122 
Primary metals 538 850 21 13 
Transport equipment 256 394 1765 
Food/beverage 354 651 171 2 
Stone/clay/glas 410 569 1334 
Fabricated metal products 334 500 1332 
Instruments 234 581 1318 
Rubber products 361 564 1000 
Totals, eleven industries 5917 10309 26489 
Totals, manufacturing 6274 1091 8 27777 
Sources: National Research Council data, cited in Mowery (1981); Mowery and Rosen-
berg (2000, p. 814). 
David and Wright, 2003; Field, 2004). My calculations also suggest, consistent 
with arguments advanced in Field (2003, 2005), a decline in the level of MFP 
in manufacturing over the 1941-1948 period. 
Technical advance in manufacturing during the 1929-1941 period was not 
as rapid and not as uniformly distributed aero s two-digit industries as was 
true during the 1920s. The performance in the Depression years looks more 
impressive, however, when contrasted with what took place in the second half 
of the century, including the "new economy" period at the end of the 1990s. 
Although technical progress was broadest and most uniformly high during the 
1920s, advance within manufacturing wa taking place across a broader frontier 
during the Depression than was the case in the 1990s. 
MFP advance in manufacturing during the Depression years was increas-
ingly dependent on organized re earch and development. Table 5.3 summa-
rizes National Research Council (NRC) data on the employment of scientists 
and engineers in US manufacturing. Total R&D employment increased from 
6,274 in 1927 to 10,918 in 1933, and then almost tripled in the next seven years, 
reaching 27,777 in 1940. 
Margo has documented the lower incidence of unemployment among pro-
fessional, technical, and managerial occupational classifications as compared, 
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for example, with unskilled or blue-collar labor, or those with fewer year 
of schooling (Margo, 1991). This is indirect evidence that the sharp increase 
in R&D employment during the Depress ion was driven more by an out-
ward shift in the demand for this type of labor than by a hift in its 
supply. 
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the real net manufacturing 
capital stock was le than 10 percent higher in 1941 than it had been in 1929, 
while, according to Kendrick, hours had ri sen 15.5 percent over the same period 
(Kendrick, 1961 , appendix, table D-II) . So, at the same time that the aggregate 
capital labor ratio in the sector fell, the relative demand for scientists and engi-
neers increased. During this period complementarity was between high-end 
labor and the disembodied technical change that was such an important feature 
of the Depression years - a contrast with the capital-skill complementarity 
emphasized by Goldin and Katz ( 1998). 
Table 5.3 lists the eleven two-digit indu trie that employed at lea t 1,000 
scientist and engineers in 1940. The chemical indu try tops the li st by a wide 
margin, followed by electrical machinery and petroleum. These three indus-
tries alone account for almost half the total R&D employment on the eve of 
the Second World War. Absent from the Ii tare tobacco, textiles, apparel, lum-
ber, furniture, paper, publishing, and leather - industrie that, with the possible 
exception of tobacco manufacture, one can identify with the fir t indu trial rev-
olution, before the Civil War. Although the emphasis here is on R&D-inten ive 
industries such as chemicals, which turned in stellar productivity result dur-
ing the Depression , it should be noted that a number of these latter industrie , 
including tobacco and textiles , also turned in very respectable MFP performance 
over the period. 
The overall trends revealed in the employment data are echoed in other R&D 
indicators. Between 1929 and 1936 the annual rate of founding of new R&D 
labs (seventy-three) exceeded the comparable statistic between 1919 and 1928 
(s ixty- ix), and real pending on R&D in manufacturing more than doubled 
during the 1930 , with an acceleration at the end of the decade (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 2000, pp. 814, 819). 
Between 1929 and 1941, as noted, MFP growth in manufacturing fell by 
half compared with 1919- 1929 (see table 5.2). There are two closely related 
questions here. On the one hand, why did MFP growth fall from 5 .12 percent per 
year to 2.60 percent per year? The main explanation i that the across-the-board 
gains from exploiting small electric motors , and reconfiguring factories from 
the multi-story pattern that mechanical di tribution of team power required to 
the one-story layout made possible by electrification, were nearing exhaustion 
by the end of the 1920 . By 1929 79 percent of manufacturing horsepower in 
the United States was already provided by electricity (Devine, 1983) . It ' not 
that productivity level in manufacturing were going to fall as a result of thi s 
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exhaustion , it's just that one could not hope to continue to generate 5 percent 
per year growth in the residual from this source. 
The related question, then, is, why didn ' t MFP growth in manufacturing 
fall more? Here the answer has to do with the contributions of a maturing 
and expanding privately funded re earch and development system that had 
begun with Thomas Edison at Menlo Park. The lion's share of private R&D 
spending was then - and i now - done in manufacturing, and a variety of new 
technological paradigm , mo t notably in chemical engineering, were ripe for 
exploitation. 
The growing importance of the manufacturing ector - it generated about a 
quarter of national income in 1929, almost a third in 1941 - helped counter-
balance the within-sector decline in MFP growth in terms of the ability of the 
sector to contribute to high and, indeed, accelerating MFP growth in the aggre-
gate economy during the 1930s. Still , this roughly 2.6 percentage point decline 
in the MFP growth rate in the ector worked in the opposite direction, reducing 
the overall importance of manufacturing in aggregate MFP growth. Clearly, one 
had to have substantial accelerations in MFP growth in other sectors in order 
to produce the 2.31 percent continuously compounded growth rate reported in 
table 5.1 for the private non-farm economy. 
That acceleration came principally within transportation and public utilities 
(about a tenth of the economy) and to a lesser degree within wholesale and retail 
distribution (about a sixth of national income). The remaining ectors, on net, 
contributed somewhat less. Agriculture i excluded from this analysis ince we 
are examining the performance of the private non-farm economy, but we know 
that the farm sector 's productivity growth in the 1930s also lagged behind that 
of the rest of the economy ( ee Field, 2003). 
With the exception of water transport, productivity performance in trans-
portation and public utilities between 1929 and 1941 was stellar (Field, 2006a). 
Of the 4.67 percent per year MFP growth in the ector, trucking and ware-
housing accounted for almo t 40 percent of the total (1.80 percentage points), 
railroad an additional 26 percent (1.22 percentage points). Thus, almo t two-
thirds of the sectoral advance took place in surface transportation, and trucking 
and warehousing alone accounted for approximately 10 percent of MFP growth 
in the entire PNE. 
It is useful to contrast the effects of the boom in street, highway, and other 
infrastructure construction during the 1930 with those of the rather different 
government-financed capital formation boom that took place during the 1940s. 
The latter effort poured more than $10 billion of taxpayer money into GOPO 
(government owned, privately operated) plants. Almost all this infusion was 
in manufacturing, and a large part went for equipment, particularly machine 
tool , in such strategic sectors as aluminum, synthetic rubber, aircraft engines, 
and aviation fuel refining (Gordon, 1969). Most of this was then sold off to the 
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private ector after the war. Thi boom in equipment investment wa as ociated 
with negative MFP growth in manufacturing between 1941 and 1948 and, partly 
as a result, a slowdown in PNE MFP growth overall (see Field, 2005, 2006a) . 
In contrast, the infrastructure pending during the 1930 had po itive pillovers 
in the private sector, particularly in transportation and distribution. 
The achievement of the 1930s built on foundations put in place during the 
Depre ion year a well a work done in thel920s and earlier. By establishing 
the groundwork for subsequent advance, the period also restocked the larder. 
For example, almo tall the development work carried out by Philo Farnsworth 
on the quintes ential po twar consumer commodity was carried out during the 
Depre sion, upported by venture capital funding. The new product (television) 
wa introduced to a wide public in 1939 at the New York World ' Fair, but the 
demands of war forestalled its full exploitation until after 1948. 
Overall , of the 2.3 1 percent CAAGR (compound average annual growth rate) 
of MFP in the private non-farm economy between 1929 and 1941 , 48 percent 
was contributed by manufacturing, 24 percent by tran port and public utilities, 
and 18 percent by whole ale and retail distribution, with the remainder of the 
PNE contributing about 11 percent (see Field, 2006a). 
We can now summarize the main di tinction between 1919- 1929 and 1929-
1941 with re pect to aggregate MFP growth and its sources. First, MFP growth in 
the 1920s was almo t entirely a story about manufacturing. Comparing the latter 
with the earlier period, there was a ignificant drop in the share of MFP growth 
in the private non-farm economy accounted for by manufacturing, from 84 
percent in the 1920 to 48 percent in the 1929-1941 period. Thi was primari ly 
due to a halving of within- ector MFP growth, only partially compensated for 
by the expanding size of the manufacturing ector. There wa also a change 
in the sources of advance - away from the one-time gains as ociated with the 
final stages of electrification to those a ociated with exploiting the result of 
organized and expanding re earch and development efforts. Thi interpretation 
is supported by the aforementioned R&D employment and expenditure data 
(see table 5.3) and by chronologies of major proces and product breakthroughs 
(Kleinknecht, 1987; Mensch, 1979; Schmookler, 1966; Field, 2003), which all 
show peaks during the 1930s, particularly its latter half. 
5.5 The end-of-century episode 
The aim of the second part of this chapter i to examine the end-of-century 
epi ode in hi torical perspective, and, in particular, to consider how much of 
the recent productivity growth and its acceleration should be credited to the 
enabling technologies of the IT revolution. If we want to take the measure of 
the IT revolution , we need to try and imagine a world in all respects similar 
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save for the availability of these enabling technologies. In their absence, saving 
flows would have been congealed in other not quite as good capital goods. 
Output and productivity growth rates would have been somewhat lower, and 
one would like to know by how much. 
Common practice in e timating the IT revolution 's impact on labor produc-
tivity to date has been to sum three components: a contribution within the 
IT-producing indu trie to MFP growth, a contribution within the IT-using 
industries to MFP growth, and a portion of the effect on labor productivity of 
capital deepening associated with the accumulation of IT capital (Oliner and 
Sichel, 2000; Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2003). 
There can be few conceptual objections to the fir t two of these component . 
We should credit to the enabling technologies most of the MFP growth in 
the semiconductor and computer/network equipment manufacturing industries 
(SIC 35 and 36) and, where it can be demon trated, a portion of non-cyclical 
MFP growth in IT-using indu tries such as securities trading and wholesale and 
retail distribution. The inclusion of the third component is more problematic, 
although it is endorsed by many, including Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995, 
p. 352) and Kienow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997, p. 608). 
The objection to including a portion of the capital deepening effect is thi . 
What one is trying to do here i to estimate the ocial aving of the IT revolution. 
In its absence, saving flows would have been congealed in a lightly less benefi-
cial array of phy ical capital good . One wants to emphasize that breakthroughs 
uch as the integrated circuit, and continuing advances in the manufacture of 
semiconductors, display screens, and mass torage devices , have saved us real 
resources in generating quality-adjusted IT ervice . We will pick that up in 
MFP growth in the IT-producing sectors. The very rapid MFP growth in these 
sectors is indeed the reason why the relative prices of semiconductors and goods 
embodying them have plummeted.6 
We al o want to ask whether the fact that aving flows were congealed in thi s 
slightly superior range of physical capital goods, as opposed to others, enabled 
a set of resource saving in other part of the economy. This we will pick up in 
MFP growth in the IT-using sector (the e are typically referred to as pillovers 
or productive externalities). 
But, unles we can make the argument that the enabling technologies of IT 
raised the rate of return to new inve tment project at the margin , and that 
there was a response of aggregate saving rates to thi rise, the capital deep-
ening effect should ultimately be credited to saving behavior, and not to the 
enabling technologie .7 It is, of course, conceivable that the enabling technolo-
gies of the IT revolution led, by raising the incremental return to investment and 
perforce saving, or by redistributing income to hou eholds with higher saving 
propensities, to an increase in the total flow of accumulation as a percentage 
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of GDP at either the US or the world level, in which case it becomes more 
difficult cleanly to distinguish between the role of aving and technical change 
in fostering labor productivity growth. 
The evidence i , however, that investment in these good did not crowd out 
consumption goods. Rather, it crowded out other not quite a good capital 
goods both within the United States and outside the country. Although we can 
comfortably posit an upward influence of IT innovations on marginal returns 
to investment and thu saving (this was, after all, the rationalization for ri ing 
tock market values during the 1990 ), we would also need to argue, in order 
to justify the inclu ion of the third component, that saving responded. And we 
would be hard-pressed to do so. 
There is a large literature on the re ponsivenes of saving to after-tax interest 
rates. Theoretically, a in the case of the re pon e of labor supply to increases 
in after-tax wages, there i the possibility of both an income and a ubstitution 
effect. Empirically, the evidence is inconclu ive, although con i tent with a 
conclusion of little net effect. As far as the income di tribution mechanism, 
there is no question that there was a trend towards greater inequality in the 
last quarter of the century, particularly in the United States, and marked by a 
widening gap in the wage of highly and le highly educated workers. But 
there is no evidence that this redistribution resulted in an increase in private 
sector saving rates . 
Some argued, particularly in the late 1990s, that saving rates were improperly 
measured because they did not include unrealized capital gains. But the con-
ventionally measured aving rate was largely invariant both to the expansion of 
stock market valuation in the 1990s and their collapse in the early twenty-first 
century. 
Between 1995 and 2000 consumption spending in the Un ited States increased 
by 34 percent, from 4,969 billion to $6,683 .7 billion nominal.8 Consumption 
ro e not just ab olutely but a a share of a ri ing GDP, from 67 .2 percent to 68 
percent. At the same time, the growth of IT capital ervices accelerated from 
0.41 percent per year (1973- 1995) to 1.03 percent per year (1995-2000). Part of 
this acceleration came at the expense of the services of other component of the 
tock within the United States , the growth of which declined from 0.30 percent 
per year in the earlier period to 0.06 percent per year (US Council of Economic 
Advisors, 2001 , p. 29). How was the boom in capital formation, much of it 1T 
capital, financed? 
Table 5.4 shows that between 1995 and 2000 there was a 611 .6 billion 
increase in gross private domestic investment as well as an increase in govern-
ment investment of $81.6 billion. How was this financed? Not by an increase 
in personal saving, which fell by a third , or by retained busine s aving (net 
bu iness saving), which fell by a quarter. Gros business saving rose, however, 
as a consequence of a 274.3 billion increase in corporate and unincorporated 
Technical change and US economic growth 101 
Table 5.4 Changes in the uses and sources of saving in the United States, 
1995-2000 
Change in 
1995 2000 uses ources 
Gross private domestic investment 1143.8 l 755.4 611.6 
Gros, government inve tment 238.2 3 19.8 81.6 
Per onal sav ing 302.4 20 1.5 - 100.9 
Retained business earnings 203.6 152.6 
Deprec iation allowance 743.6 1017.9 
Gross business sav inga 963.6 1170.5 206.9 
Gross government sav ing - 8.5 435.8 444.3 
Net foreig n inves tment - 98.0 - 395.8 297.8 
Statistical discrepancy 26.5 - 128.5 - 155.0 
Tota ls 693 .2 693. 1 
a Inc ludes wage accru al and di sbursements not hown separate ly. 
B: All numbers are billions of dollars, nominal. Thi table i based on a rearrangement 
of the open economy investment savings identity. Private domestic investment must 
be fina nced by the sum of private domestic saving, government saving, and inflows 
of foreig n sav ing (capita l account urplus or current account defi c it). Note that neg-
ative net fore ign investment is entered as a pos itive number in the source of avi ng 
co lumn . 
Source: US Council of Economic Advisor (2003, table B-32). 
capital consumption allowances . This reflected the large portion of the gross 
investment surge comprised of relatively hart-lived IT capital goods, which 
increased the importance of short-lived capital goods in the capital stock. We 
thus experienced a net change in gross private saving of $106.1 billion. 
The increase in gross domestic investment wa $693 .2 billion. After taking 
into account the effect of changes in gross private saving, a aving gap of 
almost $600 billion remain . It was filled through two main mechani sm . Fir t, 
a movement in the consolidated government urplus from -$8.5 to $435.8 
billion - a swing of $444.3 billion in the urplu direction, and, second , a 
deterioration ofnet exports from a deficit of $38 billion to one of $395 .8 billion, 
a swing of $297.8 billion. The remaining gap between the changes in the ource 
and uses of sav ing is accounted for by an increa e of $ 155 billion in the statistical 
di screpancy. 
The end-of-century inve tment boom wa enabled on the one hand by the 
willingness of foreign wealth holders to divert their saving flow from invest-
ment in their own countrie or el ewhere and make it available to the United 
States, and on the other hand by the tax policie of the Clinton administration 
l 02 Alexander J. Field 
and the second half of the George W. Bu h administration. Their fiscal policies, 
in particular modest tax increases in conjunction with an economy operating at 
close to capacity, provided the foundation for the big increase in government 
saving. 
It is conceivable that, although the IT accumulation spurt was not associated 
with a rise in the private saving rate within the United States, it was associated 
with a rise in the world saving rate. This seems unlikely, and no one has made 
this case. We are left with the conclusion that, by and large, the IT capital 
accumulation spurt in the United States represented a sub titution not away 
from consumption but away from other not quite as good capital goods, both 
within the United States and abroad. 
Whether the flows nece sary to finance capital accumulation came from 
national saving or from outside the country is irrelevant from the standpoint of 
productivity trends within the United States. But it does have welfare implica-
tions, particularly for the future. Reliance on foreign borrowing meant that the 
United States was able to forgo the sacrifice of current consumption that would 
otherwise have been the price of capital deepening. The borrowing will turn 
out to have been a good deal for the country if the increases in output per hour 
associated with the additional capital deepening exceed the increases in debt 
service per hour of labor input. But there i no guarantee that this will be the 
case; it depends on how much of the additional investment turns out to have 
been well directed. In any event, the gains in output per hour obtained through 
foreign borrowing will not be manna from heaven, given the obligation of debt 
repayment. 
Within the United States there was indubitably an acceleration in overall 
capital deepening, comparing 1995- 2000 with 1973-1995. Capital services 
per quality-adjusted hour grew at 2.93 percent per year in the latter period, 
as compared with 1.96 percent per year in the former. Thus , the slowdown in 
non-IT capital accumulation was more than compensated for by the rising rate 
of IT capital accumulation. One could argue that the drop in US private saving 
simply compensated collectively for the rise in government saving. But thi s 
seems doubtful, since the saving rate ha been trending downwards for decades 
through periods of government deficit and surplus. It is more likely that, in the 
absence of the tax increases of the early 1990s, the deterioration of the current 
account would have been even worse. 
If the enabling technologies of the IT revolution diverted towards the United 
States some portion of world saving flows that would not otherwise have come 
this way even though VS and world saving rates remained largely unaffected 
and may actually have declined, it would technically be correct to say that we 
should grant to the IT revolution that part of the growth in labor productivity 
associated with IT's share of capital deepening. But, if we care about labor 
productivity because we care ultimately about consumption per person in the 
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United States, this i a mi leading calculation. Much of the capital deepening 
has associated with it a liability tied to increased foreign indebtedne . This is 
in sharp contrast with the contributions to labor productivity growth of the first 
two components of the traditional triad used to measure IT "contributions." 
5.6 The IT contribution and social saving controversies 
The framework for reckoning the impact of the IT revolution advocated in this 
chapter, particularly it emphasis on MFP to the exclusion of the portion of the 
increase in labor productivity attributable to IT ' share of capital deepening, 
runs counter to current practice. It can be better appreciated by comparing the 
challenge of coming to terms with IT in the 1990s with one of the critical 
di putes that gave rise to the new economic history. This involved the attempt 
to estimate the social aving of the US railroads. W. W. Rostow ( 1960) argued 
that railroads were " indi pensable" to American economic growth. Both Albert 
Fishlow (1965) and Robert Fogel (1964) wanted more preci ion . They tried 
to imagine world otherwise similar save for access to the blueprints needed 
to build railroads. They calculated alternative channels for saving flow (into 
canal building and river dredging, for example) and ultimately how much lower 
US GDP would have been in this alternative world. 
The social savings calculations that came out of those debates four decades 
ago were designed to impre upon u fir t of all the fact that, because saving 
flows were congealed in railroad permanent way and rolling stock, as opposed 
to other forms of physical capital uch a canal , GDP was indeed higher than it 
otherwise would have been. But not by a whole lot. Fogel argued, for example, 
that 1890 US GDP wa about 4 percent higher than it would have been in the 
absence of the availability of the railroad. What kind of an increment to MFP 
over a quarter of a century would one have needed to produce a GDP (or output 
per hour) in 1890 4 percent higher than it otherwise would have been? About 
0.15 percent per year, continuou ly compounded. 
In fact, Abramovitz ' and Kendrick ' analyses of nineteenth-century growth 
after the Civ ii War suggest, as was true for the 1973-1995 period , that, at least up 
until 1889, almost all the growth in real output can be accounted for by growth 
in inputs conventionally measured. It would make little ense to suggest that we 
have underestimated the contribution of the availability of railroad blueprints 
to growth in living standards in the nineteenth century because we have not 
accounted for the share of the increment to output per hour attributable to that 
portion of capital deepening associated with investments in locomotives, rolling 
stock, and permanent way.9 
The key mes age of the classic works by Fishlow and Fogel was that, in the 
absence of the railroad, saving flows would have been congealed elsewhere, 
with results for the economy that would have been almost, but not quite, as 
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good. We should take the same approach to reckoning the importance of the IT 
revolution. 
In defense of what ha become the conventional approach, some labor pro-
ductivity is certainly, in an accounting sense, attributable to capital deepening. 
And a large fraction of the capital deepening, particularly at the end of the 1990s, 
was indeed associated with the accumulation of physical IT goods: computers, 
servers, fiber optic cable, routers, etc. 10 But, since the counterfactual suggested 
here imagines saving behavior largely unaffected by the pre ence or absence 
of the IT blueprints, our estimate of the portion of labor productivity growth 
attributable to sav ing (as opposed to technical innovation) should be largely 
independent of the particular forms in which sav ing flows were congealed. 
It should, to be fair, also be independent of the sources of that saving. With 
respect to the labor productivity growth caused by capital deepening, it i irrele-
vant whether the aving came from outside the country. But, from the standpoint 
of their contribution to US tandard of living, labor productivity gains from 
capital deepening financed by foreign borrowing come encumbered in a way 
that similar gains financed by dome tic aving do not. 
It is true that, if we are operating below capacity, and a new attractive inven-
tion offers profitable opportunities for new investment, it is reasonable to talk 
about the extent to which the innovation increa e real output through its effect 
on the amount of real capital formation . From an aggregate perspective, such 
inve tment will be largely self-financing Uust as, in the presence of accommoda-
tive monetary policy, will be government deficits). Under these circumstances, 
we can argue that it is inve tment that drive saving. 
But, once the economy reaches potential output, the old rules of microe-
conomics again apply. Choices have opportunity costs, and saving constrains 
investment rather than the other way around. Thi has always been the rationale 
for policy changes designed to increase the after-tax return to sav ing, and , if the 
elasticities are right, saving flows - policies that make sense from a long-range 
growth perspective but are contra-indicated if one is below capacity. By and 
large, in growth accounting one tries to abstract from cyclical effect , and study 
the effect of saving and innovation on the increa e of potential output. We want 
to know, in the long run , what the effect of the IT-enabling technologie is on the 
growth of potential output. If we are concerned with contributions to long-run 
growth, an appeal to the role of IT capital formation role in "contributing" to 
increases in real output based on these Keynesian arguments is mi placed. 
It is analogous to emphasizing, as did Ro tow, the stimulus to the iron and steel 
and lumber industries caused by late nineteenth-century railroad construction. 
That emphasis obscured the fact that, once the economy was at potential output. 
these resources had alternate uses, and the enormous costs of constructing the 
railroads raised the hurdle they had to overcome to make a positive contribu-
tion to GDP. They managed to do so, as Fogel and Fishlow demon trated, by 
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speeding up the turnover of inventories in the economy and by enabling a 
superior exploitation of regional comparative advantage. But it wa close. 
5. 7 MFP growth versus the capital deepening effect 
How important, in term of their impact on labor productivity, were the respec-
tive roles of MFP and capital deepening over the 1995-2000 period? There are 
a couple of way of looking at this. The fir tis to ask how much of the accel-
eration in labor productivity growth each is responsible for. For the private 
non-farm economy, that acceleration , comparing 1995-2000 with 1973-1995, 
was 1.09 percentage points, and about three-quarter of thi s is attributable to 
MFP acceleration . 
The contribution to the output per hour growth of the labor composition 
change was about the ame during the two periods ( lightly lower between 1995 
and 2000) . Comparing 1995-2000 with 1973-1995, capital erv ices growth 
accelerated from 3.94 percent per year to 5.38 percent per year. Growth in 
hours rose from 1.58 to 2.09 percent per year. As a result, the rate of capital 
deepening increased from 2.36 to 3.28 percent per year between 1995 and 2000. 
But, assuming a capital share of 0.32, 11 this 0.92 percentage point increase 
should have accounted for an increase in the growth of output per hour of a 
modest 0.29 percentage points. In fact, the growth of output per hour rose 1.09 
percentage points, from 1.37 to 2.46 percent per year. Almost all the balance -
about three-quarter of the total - was due to MFP acceleration. 12 
A second approach is to ask what portion of labor productivity growth (2.46 
percent per year) each is responsible for. Between 1995 and 2000 MFP growth 
was 1.14 percent per year. The rate of capital deepening was 3.28 percent per 
year. Multiplied by 0.32, thi s yields a capital deepening contribution of 1.05 
percent per year. The remainder, about 0.27 percent per year, is the contribution 
of labor quality improvement. Looked at from this perspective, we can ay that 
MFP growth accounted for less than half - about 46 percent (l .14/2.46) - of 
labor productivity growth between 1995 and 2000. Table 5.5 summarizes these 
calculations. 
There is no hard and fast guide to what metric we should prefer here, although 
for an individual country it seems to me that the more meaningful measure is 
IT 's contribution to the rate of improvement, not the rate of improvement of the 
rate of improvement, of labor productivity. For comparisons between countries, 
we should also be interested in levels. 
5.8 MFP growth in the IT-producing and -using sectors 
In spite of the various frameworks that re earchers have used to measure the 
overall impact of IT on productivity growth, there is now enough consensus to 
I 06 Alexander J. Field 
Table 5.5 The MFP contribution to labor productivity growth and 
acceleration in the United States, 1995- 2000 
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b Percentage points. 
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Sources: McKinsey Global Institute (2002); Nordhaus (2002, table 6, p. 233). 
make some non-controversial statements about trends in MFP growth and their 
sources at the end of the century. First, in spite of ome initial keptici sm (see 
Jorgen on and Stiroh, 2000), it is clear that MFP growth - and, largely because 
of it, labor productivity growth-did accelerate between 1995 and 2000. Second, 
it is generally agreed that an important contributor to labor productivity growth 
and its acceleration was MFP advance associated with technical change in the 
semiconductor industry and in the manufacture of such products as computers, 
networking devices, and telecommunications equipment that embodied them. 
This shows up in very rapid (and accelerating) rates of MFP growth in SIC 35 
and 36. 
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Third, it i likely, although the inference are more indirect and the statis-
tical upport weaker, that some of the IT-u ing sectors, in particular whole-
sale and retail trade and securities trading, began to throw off significant MFP 
growth. Two analyses of the contributions to the acceleration of labor pro-
ductivity growth (McKinsey Global In titute , 2002, and Nordhaus, 2002; see 
also US Council of Economic Advisors, 2001) are suggestive. The McKinsey 
study focuses on four year 'growth ( 1995- 1999) whereas Nordhau cover five 
( 1995-2000), and the base periods on which the acceleration i calculated differ. 
Both rely on BEA value-added data in the numerator, although the McKinsey 
study uses per ons employed rather than hours in the denominator. 
Both neverthele s find that distribution contributed substantially to the accel-
eration of labor productivity growth , and sub tantially more than did manufac-
turing, although the two studie reverse the relative contribution of whole ale 
and retail trade on the one hand, and SIC 35 and 36 on the other. Of course, one 
can 't reason directly from decompositions of labor productivity acceleration 
to conclusions about MFP acceleration. Rate of capital deepening may have 
been exceptionally rapid in these sector , explaining much of the acceleration 
of labor productivity growth. Indeed, at least through 2000, the data support 
thi view. 
Distribution was an extremely heavy user of IT capital. Largely as a conse-
quence, its overall use of capital services oared. An index of capital services 
input in whole ale di tribution rose 18.8 percent a year between 1973 and 1995 
and 20.5 percent a year between 1995 and 2000. Hours in wholesale rose only 
1.32 percent per year from 1995 to 2000. Therefore, capital deepened in the 
sector at a rate of 19 .2 percent per year over the la t five years of the cen-
tury, far higher than the average for the economy. Similar calculations for retail 
distribution show capital deepening at 15.3 percent per year over these years. 13 
The BLS " industry productivity indexe and values table" shows labor pro-
ductivity growth in wholesale trade rising from 2.82 percent per year (1987-
1995) to 4.17 percent per year (1995-2000). In retail trade the comparable 
number are 1.95 percent per year (1987- 1995) to 3.72 percent per year (1995-
2000). So labor productivity growth in distribution did accelerate. 
The problem for the residual is that, assuming a capital share of 0.32, the 
very high rates of capital deepening more than account for the labor productivity 
growth, implying negative MFP growth in both sector overall. Moreover, this 
negative growth accelerated in the 1995- 2000 period, along with the accelera-
tion in capital deepening. The bottom line is that, while heavy capital deepening 
in distribution did cause an acceleration in labor productivity growth in the sec-
tor, it i uncertain whether the results through 2000 fully ju tify the massive IT 
expenditure. 
Some of this uncertainty and pe imism may be due to an overe timate of 
how much "true" computer prices dropped, and thus an overestimate of how 
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much real IT output (and investment) grew. Thi is a controver ial uggestion, 
since a number of economi ts have actively pressured the BLS to make more use 
of hedonic methods to estimate the rate of quality improvement (and implied 
price decline) and praised it for what efforts it has made (see, for example, 
Nordhaus, 1997a). 
The most compelling argument as to why these methods might lead to some 
overestimate of real product growth is that, in products where the quality has 
improved , users are typically forced to purchase bundle of attributes, not a ll 
of which they may actually de ire or value. No one disputes that the issues 
of quality improvement and the introduction of new products are important 
challenges in constructing realistic estimates of real product growth. But some 
of the resulting estimates do not seem to atisfy a reasonableness test. 
Hedonic price technique have yielded end-of-century estimates in the range 
of - 27 percent per year for the rate of decrea e of quality-adju ted computer 
prices (Berndt, Dulberger, and Rapaport, 2000). Thi rate of price decrease 
would reduce a 1999 computer priced at $2000 to $500 over five year . Thu , 
if one used a laptop in 1999 and another in 2004 elling at the ame nominal 
price, the BEA would conclude, based on the price data received from the BLS , 
that there had been a fourfo ld increase in the ratio of capital service to hours 
in one 's work. Readers can judge, based on their own experience, whether or 
not this is reasonable. 
For the sake of argument, grant that the BLS e ti mates of the rates of decline of 
IT capital prices may have re ulted in an overestimate by the BEA ofreal product 
growth in the sector. Although thi s would, of cour e, boo t MFP growth in the 
IT-producing sector , it has the effect of worsening it in IT-using industries. 
One of the advantage of adopting the framework for reckoning the importance 
of IT proposed in thi s chapter is the elimination of the possible " incentive" to 
push for more rapid rates of estimated price decline to make IT 's contribution 
appear larger. 
Overestimating the real growth of IT service will, of course, also overes-
timate the capital deepening component of its contributions within what has 
become the conventional triadic approach. Since the framework advocated in 
thi chapter credits most of the effect of capital deepening on labor productivity 
to sav ing, rather than the availability of IT technology, one is left with the effect 
on MFP growth in the IT-producing sector , plu the effect in the IT-using 
ectors, such as di stribution, if it can be demon trated. An overestimate of real 
IT output growth will increa e the former component, while it will reduce the 
latter. The two effects may largely cancel out. 14 
For the analy is of smaller subsectors of the economy, however, the effects 
wi ll not cancel out, and the standard value-added approach as applied to sub-
ectors has been criticized precisely because it can be o sensitive to errors 
in deflation (see Basu and Fernald , 1995). For subsectors the BLS prefers its 
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KLEMS (capital, labour, energy, material , ervice ) methodology, which uses 
growth of gro output rather than value-added measure, and subtracts weighted 
input growth rate for purchased material s, energy, and business serv ices as well 
as hours and capital input. Their MFP estimates for the sector are unpublished 
and incomplete . But the unoffic ial data show MFP rising at 0.8 percent a year in 
wholesale although not at all in retail between l 992 and 1997. 15 It is likely that, 
were data available through 2000, calculated rates of growth of MFP between 
1995 and 2000 would be higher. 
With respect to retail distribution , the McKinsey study argue that virtually all 
the gains in labor productivity have been attributable to "big box" retailers such 
as Costco, Wal-Mart, and Circuit City. And it is the relative ease with which these 
can be put in place in the United States, as compared with the relative difficulty 
with which thi s can be done in Europe and other parts of the world, that Gordon 
has c ited as a principal explanation of cross-country differences in MFP growth 
in distribution, and , perforce, the economy as a whole (Gordon , 2003a). 16 
Although the McKinsey group was willing to lay at IT 's doorstep only about 
half the gains in whole ale and retail distribution (assuming one could demon-
strate them), it is important to keep in mind that these were gains in labor pro-
ductivity. The evidence for uncompensated productivity spillovers- increases in 
value added attributable to IT that aren't captured by the equipment or software 
manufacturer - is still weak. There are enough straw in the wind, however, to 
specul ate that we are in fact in the midst of a second IT revolution in di stribu-
tion, a revolution the trace of which on sector MFP data has been temporarily 
clouded, or even obliterated, by the over-deflation of IT price .17 
5.9 Summary: the 1990s and the 1930s 
Let 's now try and bring together what we can ay about the 1995-2000 episode . 
and how it relates to the 1929- 1941 period. In thi s instance, because of the 
paucity of disaggregated sectoral data outside of manufacturing, I divide the 
private non-farm economy into three subsectors: manufacturing, wholesale and 
retail trade, and other. Excluding agriculture , government, non-farm housing, 
and the non-profit sector, the private non-farm economy accounts fo r 72.4 per-
cent of value added. Using year 2000 sectoral shares, one can calculate a man-
ufacturing weight (share of PNE) of 0 .214 and a wholesale and retail trade 
weight of 0.223. 
Again, the calculations begin with BLS numbers for MFP growth for the 
PNE between 1995 and 2000 (1 .14 percent per year), and the BLS estimate 
fo r manufacturing a a whole of 2.08 percent per year (see tables 5.1 and 
5.2). For wholesale and retail trade, one lack data on MFP growth. As noted , 
unpubli shed estimate u ing the KLEMS methodology show 0.8 percent per 
year between 1992 and 1997 in whole ale, and no growth in retail. Allowing for 
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Table 5.7 Sectoral contributions to MFP growth in the United States, 
1995- 2000 
Sectoral MFP Contribution to Share of PNE 
Share of PNE growth PNE MFP growth MFP growth 
Manufacturing 0.214 2.08 0.45 0 .39 
Trade 0.223 0.70 0.16 0.14 
Other 0.563 0.94 0.53 0.47 
Total 1.000 1.14 
NB : "Private non-farm economy" exc ludes non-farm housing, health , agriculture, and 
government, which leaves 72.4 percent of value added. This is approximately the BLS 's 
current definition of the PNE. 
Sources: Sectoral shares - www.bea.doc.gov ; MFP growth in manufacturing - see 
table 5.2; MF in trade - see text. 
some acceleration towards the end of the decade in both wholesale and retail , 
and considering the relative weights of wholesale and retail , one can hazard an 
estimate of 0.7 percent per year for the sector between 1995 and 2000. 
Multiplying sectoral shares by sectoral MFP growth rates , one can estimate 
that of the 1.14 percent per year growth of MFP within the PNE between 1995 
and 2000, 0.45 percentage points originated in manufacturing, most of it due to 
the IT-producing industries, and 0.14 percentage points in distribution. Given 
the rest of the PNE's weight of 0.563, we can back out an implied MFP growth 
within it of 0.94 percent per year contributing the remaining 0.53 percentage 
points. This "other" category includes stand-out sectors such as securities trad-
ing, as well as laggards such as construction and trucking. Table 5. 7 summarizes 
these calculations. 
Suppose that one now credits all of the MFP growth in manufacturing between 
1995 and 2000 to the enabling technologies of the IT revolution, and a third 
of that in distribution and the rest of the economy. 18 We would then conclude 
that 0.68 percentage points of the 1.14 percent MFP growth between 1995 and 
2000 could be credited to IT innovations. Thus, we would attribute about 28 
percent of labor productivity growth between 1995 and 2000 (0.68/2.46 percent 
per year) to the enabling technologie of the IT revolution. 
How does this analysis compare with the recent decomposition by Jorgenson, 
Ho, and Stiroh (2003)? First, the BLS data for the private non-farm economy 
cover less than three-quarter of their aggregate. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 
include what the BLS excludes: the farm sector, government, housing, and (pre-
sumably) the non-profit sector. 19 These excluded sectors were slower-growing, 
and as a consequence their output aggregate grows at 4.07 percent between 1995 
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and 2000, versus 4.54 percent for the BLS PNE. Their hours series grows at 
1.99 percent versu 2.09 percent for the PNE. Their labor quality adjustment i 
al o lower: 0.22 percent versus 0.37 percent per year. Finally, their MFP growth 
estimate is much lower (0.62 versus 1.14) and their output per hour rises more 
slowly (2.07 percent ver us 2.46 percent) (Jorgen on, Ho, and Stiroh, 2003, 
table 2). The difference in labor productivity growth rates is less than the differ-
ence in MFP growth rate because their implied rate of capital deepening (3.88 
percent per year) i higher than for the BLS PNE (3.28). 
All these comparisons speak to the extent to which the ectors excluded by 
the BLS and added back in by Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) tend to be slower-
growing and, in the aggregate, relatively unprogressive technologically. 
Of their 2.02 percent per year growth in labor productivity between 1995 and 
2000, they attribute 0.85 percentage points to IT capital deepening and 0.45 per-
centage points to IT-related MFP growth. In other words, they "attribute" about 
two-thirds of labor productivity growth (l .30/2.02 = 0.64) to IT. Conceptually, 
their analysis is more favorable to IT becau e, like Oliner and Sichel (2000), 
they credit the sector with a (large) portion of the effect on labor productivity of 
capital deepening. But in another respect their approach is less favorable than 
that advocated in this chapter, because they credit IT innovations with none of 
the MFP growth outside the IT-producing ectors, even though, in contrast to 
some of their earlier analyses, they do now acknowledge some MFP growth 
in the rest of the economy. If one applied my framework to their data, one 
would add the 0.45 percentage points of IT-related MFP growth and a third 
of the "other" MFP growth (0.17 /3 = 0.056) to obtain 0.51 out of a total of 
2.02 percent per year attributable to the enabling technologies of IT. This is 
approx imately one-quarter of the total. 
Comparing "new economy" economic growth with the MFP boom period of 
the interwar years, the following conclusions tand out. The l 920s, the 1930s, 
and the 1990s all saw contributions to MFP growth from manufacturing but 
the percentage point contribution to PNE growth in the recent episode was 
much lower (0.45 percentage points per year, versus 1.24 percentage points 
per y'ear between 1929 and 1941 and 1.69 percentage points in the 1919- 1929 
period. Although rapid MFP advance within manufacturing was somewhat more 
localized in the 1930 than it had been in the 1920s, it was very narrowly 
concentrated at the end of the century. 
Distribution played an important role in both the 1930 and the 1990s, 
although its percentage point contribution wa three times larger in the Depre -
sion. Perhaps most striking, however, in comparison with the 1930 , the 1990s 
lacked the broad-based and very rapid advance in transportation and public 
utilities that characterized the 1930s. Although ectoral MFP estimates are 
not available across the board, labor productivity data, such as that contained 
in US Council of Economic Advisors , 2001, how growth rates declining, 
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comparing 1995-1999 with 1989- 1995, in trucking and warehousing, commu-
nications, and electric, gas, and sanitary services. For trucking and warehous-
ing, labor productivity actually fell (US Council of Economic Advisors, 2001 , 
table 1.2). 
Finally, we need to re-emphasize that, for the private non-farm economy as a 
whole, aggregate MFP advance in the 1929-1941 period was more than twice 
as fast a in 1995-2000, more than three times a fast as in 1989-2000. For the 
1930s, the question of whether or not to include a technology-driven capital 
deepening effect on labor productivity is moot, since there was effectively no 
capital deepening, at least in the private sector. 
5.10 Taking the measure of the IT revolution 
What has been incontrovertibly revolutionary about the IT revolution has been 
the operation of Moore 's law: the ability to manufacture computers, peripher-
als, and telecommunications equipment in such a fashion that output has risen 
much more rapidly than inputs conventionally measured. The plummeting costs 
of producing quality-adjusted central processing units and memory, mass stor-
age, and display devices have been for the late twentieth century an even more 
dramatic version of what spinning jennies and water frames were for the late 
eighteenth century in Britain. There is some evidence that the rate of technical 
progress in semiconductors accelerated even further after 1995, as the inter-
val required to double performance dropped from eighteen months to twelve 
months. The revolutionary character of advances in the IT industries shows 
up as higher and accelerating MFP and, perforce, labor productivity growth in 
SIC 35 and 36. Even allowing for the possibility of some overshooting in the 
estimate of output growth resulting from the use of hedonic techniques, we can 
happily and uncontroversially credit the revolution with the e gains, which flow 
directly through to improvements in the material standard of living. 
It is also likely that some - although by no means all - of the MFP advance 
in wholesale and retail distribution, securities trading, and some other sectors 
of the economy was made pos ible by IT investment , and we should credit the 
enabling technologies of the IT revolution with an appropriate share of these 
gains as well, where we can demonstrate them. But, because the IT-producing 
sectors are small in relation to the aggregate economy, and because the gain in 
the IT-using sectors have been somewhat more mode t, the boost to the growth 
of overall output per hour remains modest in comparison, for example, with the 
impact of MFP growth in the 1930s 
This accounting doe not attribute a portion of the effect of capital deepening 
to IT innovation - arguing that this is attributable to saving. An objection is 
that technical improvement, whatever its sources, might have affected saving 
behavior by raising the rate of return to incremental investments and thus, 
assumi ng there were a positive elasticity of the saving rate with respect to the 
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real after-tax interest rate, an increase in sav ing flows. Or, because of a bias in 
technical change, capital's share might have ri sen, leading to a redistribution 
of income, to hou eholds with higher sav ing propensities. Versions of the e 
arguments have been made for the period after the Civil War in the United States, 
when , it has been sugge ted, such innovations as the railroad and Bes emer and 
Siemens Martin teel elicited an upward surge in aggregate saving behavior that 
propelled the economy to higher labor productivity levels as predicted by the 
Solo model (David, 1977; Williamson , 1973, p. 591).20 
The e was indeed an acceleration of gro s capital formation in the last half of 
the 199 s, associated with a more than doubling of real investment in computers, 
telecom equipment, and software between 1995 and 2000.21 And the national 
sav ing r te did rise , barely, because government saving compensated for a 
conti nued decline in private sector saving. It i doubtful that private sav ing 
rates fe ll because tax rates were raised (the Ricardian equivalence argument), 
s ince saving rates fell in the last quarter of the century through periods of 
government deficit and surplus alike. And no one ha claimed that the changes 
in fiscal policies in the early 1990s that led to a ri se in government saving were 
a re ponse to IT innovations, a a ri e in the private sav ing rate might have been. 
Finally, the gap between private aving and national investment not filled by the 
increase in government . aving was fi lled by a diver ion of aving flows from 
outside the country toward the United States, not necessarily an augmentation 
of the world saving rate. 
These are the grounds for attributing the effect of capital deepening on labor 
productivity largely to the forces of thrift rather than innovation. In the absence 
of IT, saving flows wou ld have been congealed in a set of not quite as good 
capital good - an argument that can be, and has been, made for the railroad in 
the nineteenth century. 
Many of the frameworks used to guide thinking about the impact of the IT 
revo lution were developed during a period of sustained stock market exuberance 
when there wa enormous pressure among academics and within government 
stati stical offices to resolve the Solow paradox (computers were showing up 
everywhere but in the productivity tati tic .) We need to make ure that our 
vi ion is not clouded by the legacies of the IT publi c relations offensives of the 
1990. 
One manifestation of the effectivenes of that campaign ha been a change in 
the way that government stati tic on fixed assets are collected , classified, and 
presented. In the BEA 's "Fixed Asset Tables," for example, the a et produced 
by information technology industries are now listed first , in separate and detailed 
categories . But why are sav ing flows congealed in IT goods and software more 
or less important than those congealed in structures, machine tool , vehicle , 
nuclear fuel rod , or any of the other fixed asset categories? One might reply, 
" Because IT i a special type of capital good , one with a greater propensity 
to can-y or embody or stimulate technical innovation within using sectors." 
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A problem with thi argument is that the rise in the equipment share in capital 
formation in the United States, which began after the Second World War (Field, 
2006b), has been associated with a generally declining rate of MFP growth. To 
the degree that it is true, we will pick up the e effects in MFP growth within 
the IT-u ing sectors. 
Another intellectual legacy of the IT boom ha been the widespread and 
largely uncritical acceptance of the usefulne s of the concept of a general pur-
pose technology and the recognition of IT or computers as its principal instan-
tiation (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). While it is undoubtedly true that 
some advances are more important than other , to call omething a GPT has, in 
many in tance , been to suggest about a class of innovations or industrie that 
there was more to them than apparently met the eye, or showed up in aggregate 
tatistics. The enthusiasm for the concept run the danger of placing too much 
empha i on specific innovations awarded this designation. 
One of the difficulties with GPTs is the potential multiplicity of candidates. 
Steam, electricity, and IT are mo t freq uently identified, but chem ical engineer-
ing, the internal combustion engine, radio transmission and the assembly line 
have all also been mentioned. The identification of one or several GPT often 
offers an appealing narrative hook, but the criteria for designating them are not 
universally agreed upon, in pite of continuing efforts to nai l them down. For 
example, why isn't the railroad also a GPT? Gordon (see chapter 8) sugge t 
that u e by both households and industry is a criterion. This work for electricity 
and the internal combustion engine. But steam? 
Here is another concern. Be emer and Siemen Martin processes were 
industry-specific, and would clearly not pa s mu ter a GPT . They offered , 
to u e David 's words, "complete , elf-contained and immediately applicable 
solutions" (2004, p. 22). Thi was not the case for the product the production 
of which they enabled. Does that make steel a GPT? It took Carnegie and 
others time to persuade users that they hould make kyscraper , plate hips, 
and replace iron rail s with it. Cheap steel in turn encouraged complementary 
innovations such as, in the case of taller buildings, elevators. 
If one follows the impact of product and proce innovations far enough 
through the input-output table, one will eventually find products or technologi-
cal complexes u ed as inputs in many other sectors, with the potential to gener-
ate spillover effect in u ing sectors. These processes, products, or complexes 
are the consequence of many eparate breakthrough as well a learning by 
doing, much of which has been sector-specific. IT, for example, has required 
advances in software, ector- pecific emiconductor manufacturing, and the 
thin film technology and mechanical engineering that underlies most mass 
torage. 
Because of the potential for multiplying GPT cand idacies and the lack of 
an authoritative tribunal applying uniform rules pa sing judgment about wh ich 
ones qualify, economic and technological history may well be better off without 
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the concept. Our enthusiasm for GPTs suggests that we may till not have 
absorbed entirely the lessons of the Ro tow- Fogel- Fi hlow debate about the 
" indi spensability" of the railroad. Whereas IT has probably been responsible for 
a larger increase in MFP growth between 1995 and 2000 than was the rai lroad 
in the twenty-five years after the Civil War (compare here the e timate of 0 .15 
percent per year for the railroad with the 0.68 percent per year I attribute to 
IT between 1995 and 2000), overall MFP advance at the end of the twentieth 
century was still much lower than it had been during the 1930s. 
It is important to distinguish between the propo ition that it ometime takes 
a long time for the productivity benefits of new technological complexes to be 
reaped and the concept of a OPT. One can accept the former without necessarily 
embrac ing the usefulness of the latter. The fu ll benefits ofIT may indeed involve 
cons iderable delays before they are realized. My intent in this chapter, however, 
has been to foc us on what the tatistical record allows us to conclude ha actually 
been achieved, not on what might happen, or what we would like to believe 
wi ll happen, in the future. The end-of-century productivity revival needs to be 
understood on its own term . We should give the IT revolution its due, but not 
more than its due. 
Notes 
For comments on earlier versions of this work, I am gratefu l to ick Craft , Stanley 
Engem1an , Robert Gordon, Robert Solow, and Gavi n Wright. I al o thank sem inar 
and conference partici pant at Duke, Virginia, Indiana, Michigan, Yale, UCLA, the All 
Ohio Economic History Seminar, the World C liometric confe rence in Venice, and the 
Econom ic History Assoc iation meetings at San Jo e, Califo rnia. 
I . Some scholars re tri ct the term " Depression" to the years 1929-1933 . Thi chapter 
treat it a ex tending over the twelve-year period 1929 to 1941 , during which output 
was per i tentl y depres ed below its potenti al. In I 94 1 unemployment dipped into 
the single-digi t range (9.9 percent) for the fir t ti me in more than a decade. Even 
so, thi s was 6.7 percentage points above the 3.2 percent recorded for l 929, and 
6. 1 percentage points above the 3.8 percent recorded for 1948, o 1929- 194 1 does 
not make for an ideal peacetime peak-to-peak compari on. The data in table 5. 1 
are reported without a cyclical adjustment for 194 1. A recent paper (Fie ld, 2005) 
include one, based on a regression of the change in MFP on the change in the 
unemployment rate in percentage points between 1929 and 194 1. This regress ion 
is then used to pred ict MFP had unemployment in 194 1 been at the I 948 leve l. 
Becau e of the trong procyclicality of productivity during the Depre ion years, 
the adj ustment ra i e MFP growth fo r the 1929- 194 1 period to 2.78 percent per 
year, and lower it for the 194 1- 1948 period to 0.49 percent. Thi adju tment serves 
to accentuate further the di tinctiveness of the 1929-194 1 period. 
2. For a more extended di scussion of this issue, see Fie ld (2004a). 
3. The Standard lndu tri al Class ification (SIC) codes are being replaced in po t- 1997 
reporting with North American Industrial Classifi cation System (NAICS) codes, but 
I use the older vocabu lary throughout thi chapter. 
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4. The story to ld here is onl y weakly en 1t1ve to using l 990 rather than l 989 (the 
level of MFP in the private non-farm economy was identical, so the annual rate 
calculated would ri se lightly if we measured from 1990), although choosi ng 200 I 
rather th an 2000 reduces the calculated growth rate , ince MFP fe ll between 2000 
and 2001. 
5. "Chain-type qu antity indexes fo r net stock of nonres identia l fixed assets by industry 
gro up and lega l fo rm of organization," US Bureau of Economic Analys i (2003), or 
www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dN/FAweb/Index2002.htm . 
6. T he "dual" approach to esti mating MFP growth looks at re lative price changes across 
sectors as an a lte rnate means of infe rring its inc idence. 
7. As e rtions or a sumptions of such a I in k are numerous. "Ongoing technologica l 
advances in these (IT-produc ing) industries have been a direct source of improve-
ment in TFP growth , a well as an indirect source of more-rapid capita l deepen-
ing" (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000, p. J 28). "The spread of info rmati on tec hnology 
th roughout the economy has been a major fac to r in the accelerat ion of product ivity 
th rough capita l deepening" (US Council of Economic Adv isors, 200 l , p. 33). 
8. A ll the subsequent d i cu sion of the fi nanc ing of the 1995-2000 investment boom 
u es nominal data, which ensures that the aving-inve tment identities ho ld for each 
year. Infl ation wa re latively modest over thi s pe ri od. 
9. In thi s respect a well the ra ilroad/ infrastructure inve tment boom of the late nine-
teenth century was analogous to the IT boom of the late twentieth century: both 
tr iggered, and were as ociated with , inflows of capi ta l from outside the country. 
I 0. Esti mates of the amount of the surge in physical capital fo rmati on have been aug-
mented by the BLS' 1999 reclassification of busine s software acq ui si ti on as capita l 
fo rmation (a oppo ed to its previous treatment as an inte rmed iate good). 
l l. T he BLS capita l share fo r 1995 is 0.3268; fo r 2000, 0 .3 109. 
12. Alternatively, converting everything to an adj u ted-hour bas i , we can calculate a 
L.06 percentage po int increase in the rate of capita l deepening (capita l growth less 
adjusted-hour growth), implying that the increase in the rate of cap ital deepening 
should have been re ponsible for a 0.36 percentage po int increase in the g rowth in 
output per adj usted hour (0.34 x 1.06). Adding in the increase in MFP growth (0.76 
percentage po ints), one conc ludes that output per adj usted labor hour ho ul d have 
increased a tota l of 1.10 percentage po ints (0.36 + 0.76). 
13. T he source is the Bureau of Labor Stati tic : fo r capital, "Capita l and re lated mea-
sures from the two-d ig it database, J 948-200 I "; fo r hours, " Industry productivity 
indexes and value table," 5 November 2003. 
14 . Overe timating the real fl ow of IT goods increases the estimated growth of rea l 
output and of real output per hour, a we ll a the capita l stock and thus the rate 
of capital deepening. IT goods are, however, a much larger fracti on of investment 
than they are of output; the effect on e ti mated MFP growth is therefore amb iguous, 
a lthough it i li ke ly to reduce it. 
15. I am grateful to Larry Ro enblum of the BLS for mak ing these data avai lable to me. 
16. In a paper broadl y con i tent w ith thi view, Fo te r, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002) 
have argued that mo t of the productiv ity advance in retai l trade has been the result of 
"more product ive ente ring e tabli shment di sp lac ing much less productive exiting 
establi shments." 
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17. For di scuss ion of an earli er revo lution assoc iated with the simultaneo u deployment 
of the telegraph and the railroad, see Fie ld ( l 987, 1992, 1996) and Chandler ( 1977) . 
18. The McKinsey study places a g reat deal of emphas is on the Wal-Mart effect, both in 
te rms of its growing share of retai I trade and through its rol e as an object of imi tation 
by such fi rm as Target. But, a lthough the report grants that much of the company 's 
succes is ba ed on advanced inventory contro l methods obviously enabled by [T 
inves tment, it a lso stresse that much i ba ed on management innovati ons such 
as worker c ro -training. The implication is that , a lthough it is defensible within 
man ufacturing to c redit virtuall y all the MFP growth to IT, outside manufac turing 
thi s i not so. Many of the productiv ity-enhancing management improvements could 
and probably would have been implemented in the ab ence of new [T techno logy. 
19. Their output measure also includes an estimate of the imputed service fl ow from 
con umer du rables. 
20. According to Dav id , the nineteenth-century traverse was "set in motion by Thrift, 
that i , by a pronounced ri e in the proportion of output saved ." In some passages 
he appears to treat it as exogenous, in others as a response to an upward movement 
in the rea l interest rate. In Abramovitz and David ( 1973), the authors speak of 
" technologicall y induced traver es ." The implied argument eem to be th at new 
blueprints lead to an increase in real returns to investment, which induces an upsurge 
in the saving rate , propelling one to a different steady tate invol ving hi gher output 
per hour. In Abramovitz and David (2000), the authors suggest that the bias in 
technical change led to an increa e in capita l ' hare, which redi tributed income to 
househo lds with higher propen ities to save, and thi i the mechani m th at led to 
the upsurge in the saving rate. Williamson' 1973 paper i more consi tently based 
on an analys i of the consequences of an upward shift in saving propensities: " For 
still unknown reasons the saving rate rose markedly during the Civil War decade" 
(p. 593). 
2 1. Some of thi s surge was driven by "Y2K" concerns, pre umably a one-time event. 
Some of it wa wasted , or, as in the case of fiber optic cable in the te lecom sector, 
overbuilt. 
